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Abstract
We present a new short signature scheme based on a variant of the Boneh-Boyen’s short signatures schemes. Our
short signature scheme is secure without requiring the
random oracle model. We show how to prove a committed value embedded in our short signature. Using this
primitive, we construct an efficient anonymous credential
system.
Keywords: Anonymity, anonymous credentials, commitment, signature
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Introduction

Signature schemes are a central cryptographic primitive.
Besides being an important stand-alone application, they
also constitute a building block in many cryptographic
protocols. One of important applications of signatures is
anonymous credential.
The notion of anonymous credential was introduce by
Chaum [11]. A credential system allows a user to obtain
credentials, and to prove that he has a given set of credentials. An anonymous credential system enables a user
to work with his credentials without revealing any information not explicitly requested. A user should be able to
obtain a credential without revealing his identity, and to
prove that he has a set of credentials without revealing
any information beyond that fact. To be useful for this
application, a signature scheme must have efficient protocols for obtaining a signature on a hidden (committed)
value, and for proving in zero-knowledge the knowledge
of a signature.
An anonymous credential system should meet some essential properties: It should be secure against attacks
from a coalition of users. It should be able to be used
for multiple times, i.e., so-called “multi-show”. It is
also essential that one a credential has been issued to a

user, it cannot be transferred to any one else, i.e. “nontransferability”. It is desirable that the overheads of communication and computation imposed by a credential system to users and services must not heavily affect their
performance.
The studies of anonymous credential have gone through
several stages. After its introduction by Chaum, Brands
presented a public key based construction of anonymous
credential in which a user can provide in zero knowledge
that the credentials encoded by its certificate satisfy a
given linear Boolean formula [6]. This scheme allows only
one show, namely, two transactions from the same user
can be found performed by the same user. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya proposed an anonymous credential scheme
based on the strong RSA assumption [7]. In this scheme,
it is possible to unlinkably prove possession of a credential supporting multi-show property. There are several
other schemes that are based on different security assumptions. Verheul recently proposed an efficient solution for
multi-show credentials based on the security assumptions
of Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem [15]. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
recently also proposed generalized anonymous credential
systems and showed how to construct them from known
signature and encryption schemes [1].
As claimed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8], in order to construct an anonymous credential system, it is
sufficient to exhibit a commitment scheme, a signature
scheme, and efficient protocols for (1) proving equality of
two committed values; (2) getting a signature on a committed value (without revealing this value to the signer);
and (3) proving knowledge of a signature on a committed
value.
In this paper, we propose a variant of Boneh-Boyen
short signature scheme without random oracle such that
it can be used as a building block for cryptographic protocols. We provide a protocol to prove knowledge of a sig-
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nature on a committed message and to obtain a signature
on a committed message. Our scheme can be naturally
converted into an anonymous credential scheme.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.
In the next section, we define the definitions and requirements for signature on commitment values. The Section 3
contains some preliminaries required throughout the paper. In Section 4, we present a variant of Boneh-Boyen
short signature scheme without random oracle and give
its security analysis. In Section 5 we propose a signature on a committed message. In Section 6, we present
a basic anonymous credential system based the proposed
signature scheme. Section 7 concludes this paper.

2

Definitions and Requirements

Our signature scheme consists of a committer, a signer,
and a verifier. The committer commits to a value and
the signer then signs the committed value. Any one can
verify the correctness of the signature. The committer
can prove to the verifier that he knows the committed
value embedded in the signature.
Definition 1. Our signature scheme is a 6-tuple
of polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, Commit, Sign,
Verify, Prove, PVerify), where
• KeyGen(1` ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as
input the security parameter ` and outputs a pair of
keys (SK, VK) and param0. SK is the user’s signing
key, which is kept secret, and VK the user’s verification key, which is made public.
• Commit, a probabilistic algorithm, takes as input a
message m from the associated message space M and
a number a and outputs a commitment c.
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• KeyGen(1` ).
• CIssue: The user uses Commit and the signer uses
Sign. In the end of the process, the user obtains (c, s).
• CVerify. The user checks the validity of (c, s) using
Verify.
• CProve. Using Prove, the user proves to the service
provider about his knowledge on (m, a) and s on c
and outputs (PK, Proof).
• CVerify. The service provider checks the correctness
of (PK, proof) using PVerify.
We define the security notion for our basic signature
scheme only. It is easy to extend it to the anonymous
multi-show credential scheme.
Completeness property for the signature on commitment values is defined as follows.


(SK, VK, param0) ← KeyGen(1` ) ∧

(c, s) ← Sign(c, SK) ∧ 


true ← Verify(c, s) ∧ 
Pr 
 = 1.


(PK, Proof) ← Prove(c, s) ∧ 
true ← PVerify(PK, Proof)
We require our schemes to meet the requirement of
existentially unforgeable against the chosen message attacks. We split it into to properties: Security of signature of commitment and security of proving knowledge of
committed message in a signature. Assume there exists a
TTP adversary A who launches a chosen message attack
against our signature scheme and at most asks n queries
to the signing oracle.
·

true ← Verify(c0 , s0 ) ∧ (c0 , s0 )
← A(ci , VK, param0, i = 1, · · · , n)

¸

Pr
= ².
• Sign, a probabilistic algorithm, takes as input the
signer’s secret key SK, param0, and the commitment
Here, ² is negligible.
c and outputs a signature s ← SignSK,VK (c).
For security of proving knowledge of committed mes• Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input sage in a signature, we also require statistical zero knowlthe signed commitment c and the signer’s public key edge; that is, it is negligible for an adversary A to obtain
any information on m.
VK and outputs true or ⊥.
£
¤
• Prove is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
Pr A knows m|true ← Verify(PK(m), Proof) = ².
s and c and outputs (PK, Proof) proving the knowledge of the committed m and c without revealing the
3 Preliminaries
committed values.
• PVerify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as in- 3.1 Bilinear Pairings
put (PK, Proof) and outputs true or ⊥.
In recent years, the bilinear pairings have been widely
Our anonymous multi-show credential scheme is based
applied to cryptography and enable us to construct some
the proposed signature scheme and consists of an organew cryptographic primitives. We briefly review the necnization, a group of users, and a service provider. The
essary facts about bilinear pairings using the same notaorganization acts as the signer who issues credentials to
tion as [2, 4, 5]:
users for some service provided by the service provider.
Let G1 , G2 be (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime
Definition 2. The proposed anonymous multi-show cre- order p. Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator
dential scheme is a 5-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms of G2 . Let ψ is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 ,
(KeyGen, CIssue, CVerify, CProve, CPVerify).
with ψ(g2 ) = g1 .
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Definition 3. A map e : G1 × G2 → GT (here GT is an- and setting the commitment C = g x hr . This commitment
other multiplicative cyclic group such that |G1 | = |G2 | = scheme is information-theoretically hiding, and is binding
|GT | = p) is called a bilinear pairing if this map satisfies under the discrete logarithm assumption.
the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp ,
we have e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab .

4

A Variant of BB04 Signature
Scheme

2) Non-degeneracy: e(g1 , g2 ) 6= 1. In other words, if
g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2 , We describe the new signature scheme as follows. Let
e : G1 × G2 → GT be the bilinear pairing where
then e(g1 , g2 ) generates GT .
|G1 | = |G2 | = |GT | = p for some prime p. We assume
3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to that |p| ≥ 160. As for the message space, if the signacompute e(u, v) for all u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2 .
ture scheme is intended to be used directly for signing
messages, then |m| = 160 is good enough, because,
We say that (G1 , G2 ) are bilinear groups if there exists
given a suitable collision resistant hash function, such
a group GT , a computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 ,
as SHA-1, one can first hash a message to 160 bits, and
and a bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT as above.
then sign the resulting value. So the messages m to be
In this paper, we assume that G1 6= G2 . In this
signed can be regarded as an element in Zp . We also
case, the co-Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (co-DDH)
need a very efficient and suitable conversion function
in (G1 , G2 ) is easy, but we can still assume that the Defrom G1 to Z∗p : [·] : G1 → Z∗p . The system parameter
cision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) in G1 is hard.
is (G1 , G2 , GT , e, p, g1 , h, g2 , [·]), here g1 , h ∈ G1 ,
The following Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption is sugg ∈ G2 are random generators.
gested by [2, 13, 16]. [2] also provides a lower bound on 2
the computational complexity in a generic group model.
Key Generation.
Randomly select x, y ∈R Z∗p ,
y
x
Definition 4. (q-SDH problem) The q-Strong Diffie- and compute u = g2 , v = g2 . The public key is u, v. The
Hellman problem in (G1 , G2 ) is defined as follows: given secret key is x, y.
q
a (q + 2)-tuple (g1 , g2 , g2 γ , · · · , g2 γ ) as input, outputs a
Signing: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗p , and a
pair (g1 1/γ+x , x) where x ∈ Z∗p .
message m ∈ Zp , compute the signature
An algorithm A has advantage ² in solving q-SDH in
1
m
(G1 , G2 ) if
σ = (g m ) x+[g1 ]+yr ∈ G .
1

1

q

P r[A(g1 , g2 , g2 γ , · · · , g2 γ ) = (g1 1/γ+x , x)] ≥ ²,

Z∗p .

Here r is randomly selected from
The signature is
(r,
σ).
where the probability is over the random choice of generator in g2 ∈ G2 , of γ ∈ Z∗p , and of the random bits of
[g m ]
Verification: Verify that e(σ, ug2 1 v r ) = e(g1m , g2 ).
A.
We now give the security theorems and proofs for the
We say that the (q, t, ²)-SDH assumption holds in
above
instantiation.
(G1 , G2 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least
² in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ).
Lemma 1. If there exists a (t, qS , ²)-forger F using adaptive chosen message attack for the proposed signature

3.2

Proofs of Knowledge of Discrete Log- scheme, then there exists a (t, qS , ²)-forger F for BB04
scheme.
arithms

We will use the notation introduced by Camenisch and Proof. Recall that BB04 signature scheme is described
Stadler [10] for various proofs of knowledge of discrete as follows. The system parameter is same as the above
scheme.
logarithms. For instance,
P K{(α, β, γ) : y = g α hβ ∧ z = g 0α h0γ ∧ (a ≤ α ≤ b)}

Key Generation.
Randomly select x, y ∈R Z∗p ,
x
and compute u = g2 , v = g2y . The public key is u, v. The
is used for proving the knowledge of integers α, β and γ secret key is x, y.
such that y = g α hβ and z = g 0α h0γ holds, where a ≤ α ≤
b. Here y, g, h, z, g 0 and h0 are elements of some groups Signing: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗ , and a
p
G =< g >=< h > and GT =< g 0 >=< h0 >.
message m ∈ Zp , compute the signature

3.3

Pedersen Commitment Scheme

1

σ = g1x+m+yr ∈ G1 .

Recall the Pedersen commitment scheme [14]: given a The signature is (r, σ).
group G of prime order p with generators g and h, a commitment to x ∈ Z∗p is formed by choosing a random r ∈ Z∗p Verification: Verify that e(σ, ug2m v r ) = e(g1 , g2 ).
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Suppose that there exists a (t, qS , ²)-forger F using
adaptive chosen message attack for the proposed signature scheme, i.e., after at most qS signatures queries and
t processing time, F outputs a valid signature forgery
(r, σ) on message m with probability at least ², here
[g m ]
e(σ, ug2 1 v r ) = e(g1m , g2 ).
−1
Let m0 = [g1m ], σ 0 = σ m , then we have a forgery on
BBS04 scheme. This is because of
0

−1

[g m ]

e(σ 0 , ug2m v r ) = e(σ m , ug2 1 v r ) = e(g1 , g2 ).

Theorem 1 ([2]). Suppose the (q, t0 , ²0 )-SDH assumption
holds in G. Then BBS04 signature scheme is (t, qS , ²)secure against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack provided that
qS < q, ² ≥ 2(²0 +

qS
) ≈ 2²0 , t ≤ t0 − Θ(q 2 T ),
p

where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in
(G1 , G2 ).
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proof of knowledge of a signed message for above signature scheme.
Common input.
The system parameter is (G1 ,
G2 , GT , e, p, g1 , h, g2 , [·]), and the public key (u, v).
Prover’s input.
The committed message m and
a, and signature (r, σ).
Protocol. The prover does the following:
1) Compute a blinded version of his signature (r, σ):
Randomly select r1 , r2 ∈R Z∗p , and compute
[c]

r [c]

c0 = (ug2 v r )r1 = ur1 g21 v rr1 , σ 0 = σ r2 .
Send (c0 , σ 0 ) to the verifier.
2) PVerify. The prover and verifier compute the following values:
A = e(σ 0 , c0 ), B = e(g1 , g2 ), C = e(h, g2 )

So, we have the following theorem:

and then carry out the following zero-knowledge
proof protocols:

Theorem 2. The proposed signature scheme is secure
against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack if the (q, t0 , ²0 )-SDH assumption holds in
(G1 , G2 ).

ZKP {(α, β, λ1 , λ2 , λ3 )|A
= B α C β ∧ c0 = uλ1 g2λ2 v λ3 ∧ λ1 6= 0}.

Here α = mr1 r2 , β = ar1 r2 , λ1 = r1 , λ2 = r1 [c], λ3 =
rr
5 Obtaining a Signature on a 1 . blind the credential by using two randomly generate
numbers r1 , r2 . The completeness of the proposed signaCommitted Value
ture scheme on a committed value is obvious. Due to the
using of two randomly generate numbers r1 , r2 , the protoFollowing Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, in order to con- col can provide the anonymity. The protocol above uses
struct an anonymous credential system, it is sufficient to zero-knowledge proof, so, it is a zero-knowledge proof of
exhibit a signature on a committed value. We provide a a signature on a value.
new signature on a committed value based on the variant
of BB04 signature scheme in this section.
The system parameter is (G1 , G2 , GT , e, p, g1 , h, g2 , 6
A Multi-show Anonymous Cre[·]), here g1 , h ∈ G1 , g2 ∈ G2 are random generators.

dential Scheme

Z∗p ,

KeyGen. Randomly select x, y ∈R
and compute
Based on the proposed signature scheme, we can now conu = g2x , v = g2y . The public key is u, v. The secret key is
struct the multi-show anonymous credential scheme. We
x, y.
will follow the notations given previously in this paper.
The system parameter is same as above signature
m a
Commit: Compute c = g1 h .
scheme.
Sign: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗p , and a commitment c ∈ G1 , compute the signature as follows:
Randomly select r ∈R Z∗p , compute
1

σ = c x+[c]+ry ∈ G1 .
The signature one c = g1m ha is (r, σ).

• KeyGen(1` ): Generate public (u, v) and private signing key (x, y).
• CIssue: The user commits to (m, a) by computing
c = g1m ha . and the signer computes the signature on
1
c: (r, σ = c x+[c]+ry ).
[c]

Verify: Verify that e(σ,
Prove:

[c]
ug2 v r )

= e(c, g2 ).

The following protocol is a zero-knowledge

?

• CVerify. The user checks e(σ, ug2 v r ) = e(c, g2 ).
• CProve. Using Prove, the user proves to the service
provider about his knowledge on (m, a) and (r, σ) on
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c and outputs (PK, Proof). Here, the (Proof) is the
zero-knowledge proof:
ZKP {(α, β, λ1 , λ2 , λ3 )|A
= B α C β ∧ c0 = uλ1 g2λ2 v λ3 ∧ λ1 6= 0}.
• CVerify. The service provider checks the correctness
of (PK, Proof) using PVerify.
Our credential scheme is of multi-show, i.e., the user
can blind the credential by using two randomly generate numbers r1 , r2 . The credential itself is never sent to
the service provider in clear. Clearly, our scheme also
supports non-transferability. To show a credential to the
service provider, the user has to know his secret (m, a).
Of course, we have to assume that his secret should not
be given to others. However, it is also not hard for us
to modify the scheme such that there exists a revocation
manager who can revoke the identity of the user if needed.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a variant of Boneh-Boyen short
signature scheme without random oracle such that it can
be used as a building block for cryptographic protocols.
We provide a protocol to prove knowledge of a signature
on a committed message and to obtain a signature on
a committed message such that it can be converted into
an efficient multi-show credential scheme. The proposed
signature scheme on a committed value in this paper has
many good properties, and for the further work, we expect
to design a group signature scheme based on this signature
scheme.
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